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There are four key reasons why food manufacturers are interested in sustainable 
strategies, investing in sustainable practices, and/or launching a new sustainable product 
to the market. First, launching new sustainable products can be a public relations strategy 
of the firms to improve their image and brand. There were 13,000 new sustainable food 
and beverages launched between 2005-10 (Mintel, 2010). Consumers are more likely to 
percept which brands are green when brands are familiar and have good reputations in 
general, especially if brands have green marketing campagins (Mintel, 2010). This is also 
supported by the Accenture and United Nation Global Compact (UNGC) who 
interviewed 766 CEOs around the world in 2010 and found that manufacturers invest in 
sustainability for three reasons: brand, trust and reputation (Broder, 2010). Second, 
manufacturers also invest in sustainable practices to reduce production costs and increase 
their competitiveness. The Accenture and UNGC studies showed that CEOs realize that 
sustainablility practice can be a source of cost efficiency and revenue growth even during 
the economic downturn period (Broder, 2010). Third, global retailers are using their 
market power to strongly encourage manufactures to produce sustainable products. For 
example, Walmart, which has more than 100,000 global suppliers and more than 8,000 
stores, is currently creating a “Sustainability Index” (targeting 2014 completion) that can 
measure the environmental performance of suppliers in order to inform its customers 
about a product’s “lifecycle”, and create efficiecy by reducing costs and waste (Mintel, 
2010). With WalMart’s market power, its sustainablility practice is expected to influence 
not only other retailers but also manufactures in the near future. Lastly, Consumers are 
demanding manufacturers to be more environmentally friendly (Oberholtzer, Greene, and 
Lopez, 2006) and want to know where their food comes from and how it is produced. 
84% of the U.S. interviewed consumers indicate that they sometimes or regularly 
purchase sustainable food and drink, expecially local and recyclable packaging claims 
(Mintel, 2010). 
Although sustainability is at the forefront of most food manufacturer and retailing 
CEOs’ minds, most food manufactures are reluctant to implement sustainable practices, 
and develop and market new sustainable food products. Part of their reluctance is due to 
two main reasons:1) lack of technology to produce sustainable products, and 2) lack of 
systematic decision model that includes all variables especially the variables from the 
demand side.  
The model that will be developed in this paper is a culmination of product launch 
strategies, and agribusiness and game theory literature. Several works studied both 
theoretically and empirically the innovation strategies of firms in oligopoly markets, 
especially the theoretical and empirical literature on innovation strategy; on launch 
strategies, food industry and game theory, specifically duopoly markets for innovation 
strategies (Yoon, and Lilien, 1985, Acs, and Audretsch, 1987, Dockner, and Jorgensen, 
1988, Debruyne, et. al., 2002, Broring, 2007). Moreover, numerous industrial 
organization papers investigate new product launching strategies, such as the signaling 
game (Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon, 1995), and reaction strategies (Debruyne, et 3 
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al., 2002). In the agribusiness field, several papers used game theory to construct 
agriculture product launch strategies (Russo, Cardillo, and Perito, 2003, Hitsch, 2006, 
and Broring, 2007).  
 
The Egg Industry 
The egg industry in the U.S. is a huge and important industry with a market size 
equal to $ 5.10 billion in 2007 and a growth rate from 2006 to 2007 equal to 11.8% 
(Mintel, 2008). There are two main segmentations for the egg market which are fresh 
eggs, and egg substitutes. In 2007, egg substitutes had a market share of only 5.2%; 
while, fresh eggs had a market share equal to 94.8% which has a market size equal to 
$ 4.89 billion (Mintel, 2008). Fresh egg categories are regular eggs and specialty eggs. 
Examples of specialty eggs are free-range eggs, organic eggs, eggs fortified with Omega-
3, low-cholesterol eggs, and vegetarian-fed eggs.  
Store brands dominate national brands and regional brands in the egg market. 
That is in 2007 store brands had a market share equal to 68.8%, while Eggland’s Best, 
Rose Acre Farms, Land O’Lakes Inc, Cal Maine Foods, Dean Food Co., Michael Foods 
Inc.,  ConAgra Foods, Inc., and others had market share equal to 7.9%, 2%, 1.4%, 1.2%, 
1.1%, 0.9%, 0.9%, and 15.8%, respectively (Mintel, 2008). 
In our study, sustainable eggs include free-range eggs, and free-cage eggs. Hens 
are generally raised in a cage system. There are about 95% of eggs in the U.S. (and 90% 
around the world) from cage (conventional) housing systems (United Egg Producer, ---). 
There is no legal definition for free-range and free-cage eggs in the U.S. However, 
according to the Egg Nutrition Center, free-range eggs are from hens that are either raised 
outdoors or can access outside; while, free-cage eggs are from hens that live in indoor 
floor facilities, but do not necessarily have access to the outdoors. Consumers who have 
concerns on animal welfare prefer and have more willingness to pay for a method of 
animal husbandry that allows hens to roam freely instead of being in cages (Bennett, 
1998). 
The free-range or free-cage egg is not a new product in the sense that it is never 
launched in the U.S. market before. However, the food manufactures have to decide 
whether they should launch the sustainable egg in the new region/market that there is no 
supply of the sustainable eggs before or there is no information about the demand side. 
There are two main reasons why the egg industry is a great industry to use as an example 
to understand the egg manufactures’ decision making whether the firms should launch the 
sustainable egg which is a free-rang or free-cage egg. First, an increase in concern about 
the welfare of animals, and the new legislation concerning egg production influence 
many egg manufactures making the decision to market sustainable eggs; which include 
cage-free and free-range eggs. Second, the data about the costs and the price premiums of 
the sustainable eggs for the simulation part are available.  
 
This study is unique for four main reasons. First, our study captures concern about 
the difference between consumers’ maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable and 
the conventional products which is a constant term in an inverse demand.  Second, the 
model captures the degrees of substitution between products which include both the 
degrees of substitution between different types of products (conventional and sustainable 
products), and the degrees of substitution between brands of products. Third, the model is 4 
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extended to incorporate demand uncertainty (Appendix A). That is a firm does not know 
whether consumers are willing to pay a premium for a new sustainable food products. 
The last reason is that the study incorporates these dimensions within a food supply chain 




The Objectives of the study are: 1) to model the manufacturers decision making 
process for launching a sustainable product, and 2) to construct a model that informs the 
food manufacturers that under which conditions make the leader firm’s profit higher than 
the follower firm’s profit. Specifically, we explore the optimal conditions for a food 
manufacturer to invest in launching a new sustainable food product; which includes:1) 
threshold for consumers’ maximum willingness to pay 2) degrees of substitution between 




In this analysis, a frim produces only one type of product, either a conventional 
product or a sustainable product in each stage for the simplicity of the model. There are 
three stages in the analysis as shown in Fiugure 1. The first stage is a status quo stage 
which both leader (firm i) and follower (firm  j ) produce a conventional product (c). 
Both firms set prices as a strategy simultaneously. This stage will continue as a repeated 
game until the leader decides to launch a new sustainable product. The second stage 
happens when the leader firm has know-how to produce a sustainable product (s ) and 
decides to launch it to get a higher profit. In this stage, both firms use price as the choice 
variable and set their prices simultaneously. This stage is concluded when the follower 
also decides to launch a new sustainable product. In the third stage, both leader and 
follower firms launch a new sustainable product. The leader sets the price of its own 
sustainable product first and the follower sets the price of its product later since the leader 
has already produced sustainable product. This stage is concluded when the market 
becomes similar to the first stage, except both firms produce the sustainable products at 





































Firm i produces a 
sustainable product; 















       




This study uses a vertical differentiated products model
2 because branded 
products are similar but they are not identical/ homogeneous. The structure of inverse 
demand functions for the vertical differentiated products of firm i in the first stage is 
j c i c c i c q q a p , 1 , ,     .  i c p ,  is the price of the conventional product of firm i.  c a  
represents the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay for a conventional product which 
has a value greater than zero.  i c q ,  is the quantity demand for conventional products of 
firm i, which we normalize the coefficient to one for the simplicity. The negative sign 
for  i c q ,  shows an inverse relationship between price and quantity (law of demand).  j c q ,  is 
the quantity of conventional products of firm  j  or a quantity of a substitution good. The 
negative sign for  j c q ,  shows a negative relationship between price and quantity of its 
substitute good.  1   is the degree of substitution between the conventional products of 
firm i and firm  j  in the first stage.  1   has a value between zero and one. If  1   is equal to 
zero, firm i is a monopoly, that is, the quantity of the same product from firm  j  has no 
effect on the price of the conventional good from firm i. On the other hand, if  1   equals 
one,  j c q ,  is a perfect substitute product of   i c q , . This means that the higher value of  , 
the higher value of the degree of substitution. The structure of the inverse demand 
functions of firm i and  j  in every stage are similar to the above inverse demand function 
except the degree of substitution in the second stage is asymmetrical. 
The inverse demand functions in each stage are as follows: 
Stage 1: A Bertrand game 
j c i c c i c q q a p , 1 , ,     , and            (1)   
i c j c c j c q q a p , 1 , ,     .            (2) 
Stage 2: A Bertrand game 
                                                 
1 Assume that firm i  is a leader in our study. 





i s s i s q q a p , 2 , ,     , and            (3) 
i s
c
j c c j c q q a p , 2 , ,     .            (4) 
Stage 3: A Stackelberg Leader in Price Game 
j s i s s i s q q a p , 3 , ,     , and            (5)   
i s j s s j s q q a p , 3 , ,     .            (6) 
The inverse demand functions in the first and the third stage are similar. In  both stages, 
firms produce the same type of products; thus the constant term in equation (1) and (2), 
c a , are the same; as well as, the constant term in equation (5) and (6),  s a , are the same. 
Moreover, the degrees of substitution in the first and the third stages are symmetrical. In 
the second stage, the constant term of inverse demand functions of firm i  and firm  j  and 
the degrees of substitution in equation (3) and (4) are different since they produce two 
different types of products.  
Assume that  1 0 1 3 2 2         
c s  and that   is greater than zero because two 
products are substitute products, and is less than one because the own-price effect 
dominates the cross-price effect (Shy, 1995).  1  , which is the degree of substitution in the 
first stage, represents brand difference of firm i and  j . 
s
2   and 
c
2   are degrees of 
substitution in the second stage of an inverse demand function of a sustainable product 
and an inverse demand function of a converntional product respectively which should 
represent the brand and product difference. However, 
s
2   and 
c
2   in this model represent 
only the product difference because the brand difference has a little effect compared to 
the product difference effect, and we would like to keep the model as simple as possible. 
c
2   is greater than 
s
2   because a consumer who would like to buy a sustainable product 
has a lower degree of substitution for a conventional product; while a consumer who buys 
a conventional product has a higher degree of product substitution for a sustainable 
product. For example, when conventional eggs are on sale, a consumer who intends to 
buy free-range eggs has difficulty switching to discounted conventional eggs. However, 
if free-range eggs are on sale and have a price close to a conventional product, a 
consumer who buys a conventional product will be easier to switch to buy discounted 
free-range eggs.  3   is the degree of substition in the third stage representing the brand 
difference and the brand loyalty for a leader firm in a new market.  3   is lower than  1   
because  3   captures both brand difference and first-mover advantage (in the sense that 
consumers have brand loyalty to the leader’s brand and launching the new sustainable 
product first supports leader’s goodwill and reputation).  
We also assume that the maximum willingness to pay for the conventional 
product,  c a  is less than the maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable product,  s a . 
This implies that a consumer has a greater willingness to pay for a sustainable product 
than a conventional product. In addition, assume that the maximum willingness to pay is 




















, j s i s    can be found in Appendix B. We compare 
profits at equilibrium (*) to find the conditons that allow the leader to get higher profits 
than the follower in each stage, and the conditions to move to the next stages. The 
comparisons will be made based on the restrictions about the maximum willngness to 
pay, the degress of substitution, and the marginal costs. Moreover, the author also uses 
the simulation results in order to better understand the standard findings and propositions. 
Backward induction allows us to determine under what conditions do the 
manufacturers launch a sustainable product. That is the leader (firm i) considers the 
reaction of firm  j  when the leader launch a new sustainable product first, and then 
decides later whether to launch a new sustainable product or not. From Figure 2, the 
decision of the leader to launch a new sustainable product (move to the second stage) 
does not depend on only the comparison of the leader’s profits in the first and the second 
stages, but also the comparison of the leader’s profits in the first and the third stage. That 
is the analysis has to cover case 1 and 2 (Figure 2.1 and 2.2) when the follower also 
decides to lauch a new sustainable product after the leader’s launch. 
 
Figure 2: Backward induction decision tree 
 
 
From Figure 2, there are four possible cases. The first case (Figure 2.1) is that the 




, j c j s    , and the leader 




, i c i s    . The second case 
(Figure 2.2) is where the follower decides to launch a new sustainable product 
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, j c j s    ) when the leader decides to launch a new sustainable product. However, 




, i s i c    , and decides not to launch a new sustainable product. 
Thus, there is no product launch. The third case (Figure 2.3) is that the follower decides 





, j s j c    . Moreover, the leader also decides to not launch a new sustainable 




, i s i c    . The last case (Figure 2.4) is that the follower decides to not 




, j s j c    ) when the leader launches a new 






























































, j s j c    . 
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Figure 2.4: Case 4, only the leader firm launches a new sustainable product. 
 
Figure 3 shows the diagram for the assumptions, the standard findings, and the 
propositions from the study in order to be easy to understand. The black boxes show the 
assumptions, the standard findings and the propositions from the comparison of the 
profits of two firms in the first, the second, and the stage; while, the red boxes show the 
assumptions, and the propositions regarding to moving to the next stage. There are two 
set of red boxes that contain the assumptions and the propositions regarding to moving to 
the second stage. That is there are two separate ways to move to the second stage: 1) 
comparing the leader’s profits in the first and the second stage and 2) comparing the 
leader’s profits in the first and the third stage which is consistent with the explaination for 
Figure 2. In addition, there are the uncertainty in the second stage (Appendix A); 
therefore, there is a risk variable ( ) in the boxes that involve the profits in the second 
stage.   
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Fiugre 3: Diagram for Standard Findings and Proposition
STAGE 1 
Standard Finding 1 
Move to stage 2  when  




+   either  ,or     
and   Proposition 3 
+  ,  ,    
Proposition 6   
STAGE 2 
 Standard Finding 4  
+   Standard Finding 2 
 
No Risk ( )    Risk ( ) 
Proposition 1   Common Assumptions:   
      +   Proposition 8 
      +     Proposition 9 
        +   Proposition 10 
STAGE 3 
 Standard Finding 3 
Move to Stage when  
Common Assumptions:  ,  , and
 Proposition 4 
Move to stage 2 when  
Risk ( ) 
,  
, 
and     
Proposition 7 
No Risk ( ) 
Common Assumptions:  
,   ,  
, and   
+   Proposition 2 




The next section presents the Standard Findings and Propositions
3 from 
comparing profits of both firms in each stage. Then, the Standard Findings and 
Propositions regarding to moving to the next stage is presented later 
 
The Standard Findings and Propositions from comparing profits of both firms in each 
stage 
 
Standard Finding 1: In the first stage, marginal costs
4 determine which firm has a 
higher profit. Moreover, the difference in marginal costs and the degree of substitution  1   
determine the diffence in the amount of profit. The larger difference in marginal costs 
and the larger degree of substitiution result to the larger difference in profit. 
Explaination: Since  1   is symmetrical for both inverse demand functions in the first 
stage ( j c i c c i c q q a p , 1 , ,     , and  i c j c c j c q q a p , 1 , ,     ), both firms face the same 
demand functions. Therefore, the firm who has a lower marginal cost will get a higher 
profit.  Moreover, consumers easily switch to buy another product which has the lower 
cost and price when the degree of substitution ( 1  ) is high. Figure 4 shows the summary 








,  . When k  equals 1,  i c c , and  j c c ,  have the same value, and 
when k  is less (more) than 1,  i c c ,  is less (more) than  j c c , . Figure 4.1 and 4.2 present the 
simulation results relate to this standard finding. Figure 4.1 shows that when the marginal 
cost of firm i is lower (higher) than the marginal cost of firm  j  or k  < 1 (k  > 1), the 









, j c i c     < 0). From Figure 4.2, when the degree of substitution ( 1  ) changes, the 




, j c i c    ) does not change; however 


















                                                 
3 The proof of all Standard findings and Propositions are contained in Appendix C. 







Fiugre 4.1: the simulation results to show the relationship between the difference 









Fiugre 4.2: the simulation results to show the relationship between the difference 




, j c i c    ), and the degree of substiion ( 1  ) 
 
Fiugre 4: the simulation results to show the relationship between the difference in 
profits, and the degree of substiion or the difference in cost 
 
 
Standard Finding 2: When the degree of substitution of a conventional product and a 
sustainable product are the same in the second stage, 
s c
2 2    , and the intercept of the 
inverse demand functions are the same for the conventional product and the sustainable 
product ( c s a a  ), the follower will have a higher profit than the leader.  
Explaination: If the leader has higher costs to produce a sustainable product, consumers 
are willing to pay the premium for the the sustainable product and consumers think that 
the conventional and sustainable products are the same, the leader will get a lower profit 
than a follower.  
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z  ,      0 < 
, , y x and z  < 1 (we will use this definition for the whole analysis), the leader will get a 
higher profit than the follower’s if 
a.  z y  and,   
  ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 [









y x xy y z





    
    
 , or 
b.  z y  , or 
c.   y z   and,   
  ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 [









y x xy y z





     
     
 .  
In case a. and b., the leader will have a higher probability of getting higher profit 
than the follower as  y  goes higher, and z gets smaller. 






, which is  j c c , /( i c c ,  + the additional cost for the sustainable 
product). An increase in  y  can imply a lower marginal cost for the sustainable 
production or the higher marginal cost of the conventional product, so there is a higher 
probability that the leader who produces the sustainable product will get a higher profit. 
In addition, z  equals  c a /( c a  + the additional maximum willingness to pay for the 
sustainable product). A decrease in z  implies a higher amount of additional maximum 
willingness to pay for the sustainable product; hence, the leader gets higher price and 
profit when producing the sustainable product. 








c , ,   implies that the additional cost to produce the 
sustianable product can be coverd by the additioanal maximum willingness to pay for the 
sustainable product. Figure 5 shows that 
2
,i s D  and 
2
, j c D are demand curves for the 
sustainable product of firm i and for the conventional product of firm  j in the second 
stage.  
2
,i s D  has the same slope and is just a parallel shift outward from 
2
, j c D , meaning 
they face a greater demand but similar elasticity along the demand curve.  The y-intercept 
of 
2
,i s D  is higher than the y-intercept of 
2
, j c D  because  c s a a   and  *
2
,i s q > *
2
, j c q . When 
z y   the equilibrium quantity and price of firm i is greater than equilibrium the quantity 
and price of firm  j  ( *
2
,i s q > *
2
, j c q  and  *
2
,i s p > *
2
, j c p ), and the profit of firm i  is 
greater than the profit of firm  j  (area  *
2
,i s p ab i s c , > area  *
2

































Figure 5: The graph to compare the profits of two firms in the second stage 
 
 
When  z y  , the equilibrium quantity of the leader is greater than the equilibrium 




, j c i s q q  ), and also the margin of the leader is greater than 
the margin of the follower ( i s i s c p ,
2
, * ) > ( j c j c c p ,
2
, * ). Therefore, the profit of the 
leader is actually greater than the profit of the follower. The condition 
 
  ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 [









y x xy y z





     
     
  is a mathematical condition to confirm 
that the y-intercept is greater than the marginal cost (
2
, 2 i s
c
c q a   > j c c , ). This is because 
when  y is higher, it implies the higher value of  j c c , ; therefore, there is a condition to 
make sure that the conventional market still exists. 




, j c i s    , 
and  s a  when  z y  ,  z y  , and  z y  . According to the figures from the egg industry, 
the simulation shows that  *
2
,i s   will be less than  *
2































, j c i s    , 
and  s a  when  z y  ,  z y  , and  z y   
 
 
Standard Finding 3: In the third stage, when both firms have the same (marginal) cost 
( j s i s c c , ,  ), the follower will get a higher profit with a lower price and a higher 
quantity. This is the same result as Boyer and Moreaux, 1987; Shy, 1995; and Denicolo 
and Lambertini 1996. 
Explaination: Under the Stackleberg price leadership model, the leader sets the price 
first, and the follower set the price after observing the market. Under the same marginal 
cost, the follower will under cut the price of the leader in order to get a higher market 
share and a higher profit. That is, in the strackleberg price leadership model, the follower 
gets a second-mover advantage in the sense that the follower has more information about 





Figure 7.1:  3   =0.5 
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Figure 7.2:  3   =0.9 
 
Fiugre 7: the simulation results to compare the profits, prices, quantities, and 
costs of two firms in the third stage 
   
Figure 7 shows the simulation results comparing the profits, prices, quantities, and 
costs of two firms in the third stage. The equilibrium profit of firm iis less than the 




, j s i s    < 0) when  j s i s c c , ,  . Moreover,  *
3
, j s p  is less 
than  *
3
,i s p  since the follower tries to under cut the price to get the higher market share 
( *
3
, j s q  >  *
3
,i s q ) and profit. When the market expands (a high value of  s a ), the 
difference in equilibrium profits, prices and quantities are higher. Moreover, when  3   is 




, i s j s q q  ) is higher because 
consumers easily switch to buy a product with lower price when they perceive that the 
products from two firm are the same. 
 
The Standard Findings and Propositions regarding to moving to the next stage 
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,    or the ratio of the marginal cost of the conventional 
product over the marginal cost of the sustainable product equals the maximum 
willingness to pay for the conventional product over the maximum willingness to pay for 
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2 1    , and  j c i c c c , ,  , the leader will decide to launch 
a new sustainable product (move to the second stage) in order to get a higher profit. 
 

















 , and either  3 1     or  j c i c c c , ,   and  j s i s c c , ,  , the 
leader will decide to launch a new sustainable product (move to the second stage) in 
order to get a higher profit. 
Explaination: Proposition 2 expresses the restrictions that inspire the leader to launch a 
new sustainable product by comparing the profit of the leader in the first stage and the 























Figure 8: The graph to compare the profits of the leader in the first 
and the second stage 
 
 
Figure 8 shows that the leader launches a new sustainable product, but the 
consumers are not willing to pay more for the sustainable product ( s c a a  ), the demand 
function will shift from 
1
,i c D  to 
2
,i s D . 
1
,i c D  has the same slope as 
2
,i s D  which equal to -1, but 
the y-intercept will be lower because 
2
, j c q  is higher than 
1
, j c q . That is when the leader has 
the higher cost, the leader has to set the higher price which allows the follower to get a 
higher market share. The leader’s profit in the first stage which equals to the area 
* 1
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i c c ,  can be less or more than the leader’s profit in the second stage (the area 
* 2
,i c p cd i s c , )
5. 
However, if consumers have a higher maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable 
product (or the market is expanded) ( c s a a   and  z y  ); then, the leader will get the 
higher profit when launcing the sustainable product. Figure 6 shows that when the 
demand is shifted from 
1
,i c D  to  '
2
,i s D , the leader will get the higher profit (area 
* ' 2
,i c p ef
i s c ,  > area 
* 1
,i c p ab i c c , ). 













2 1    , and 
j c i c c c , ,  ), Figure 9 shows that  *
2
,i s  is greater than  *
2




, i c i s     > 0). 








Figure 9: The simulation results to compare the profits of the 
leader in the first and the second stage 
 
 
Proposition 3 expresses the restrictions that make the leader launches a new 
sustainable product by comparing the profit of the leader in the first stage and the third 
stage.The simulation results to compare between the leader’s profit in the first and the 
third stage are shown in Figure 10. Figure 10.1 shows the simulation results when 
3 1    , but neither j c i c c c , ,   nor  j s i s c c , ,  ; while, Figure 10.2 shows the simulation 
results when  j c i c c c , ,   and  j s i s c c , ,  , but  3 1    . The interpretation and the intuition of 









                                                 
5 This is similar to the result in Proposition 6. 
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Figure 10.1: Assume that  j c i c c c , ,   and  j s i s c c , ,  . 
 
Figure 10: The simulation results to compare the profits of the 
leader in the first and the third stage 
 
 











, ,  3 2 2     
s c , and  j s i s c c , ,  , the follower will decide to 
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Explaination: The intuitions for Proposition 4a. is that when the conventional product 
can substitue for the sustainable product at a low level ( 746478 . 0 0 2  
s  ), the follower 
will get a higher profit when launch a new sustainable product. That is when the product 
of the follower can substitute for the leader’s product at a low degree, the follower will 
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launch a new product to grab the market share from the leader in order to get higher 
profits. Proposition 4b shows that under the high value of degree of substitution between 
the conventional and sustainable products ( 1 746478 . 0 2  
s  ), the follower will get a 
higher profit when launch a new product if the marginal cost of the sustainable product is 




2 2 2 2 2
) 2 (
] 16 ) 8 ) 4 )( 3 )(( 2 [( 25 . 0

    
s
s s s s s

    
 is lower than  y . 
Figure 11 shows the simultion results that compare the follower’s profits in the 
second and the third stage. Figure 11.1 and Figure 11.2 shows the results that are 
consistent with Proposition 4a and 4b, respectively. That is   *
3
, j s   is always higher than 
*
2
, j c   when  746478 . 0 0 2  
s  . Moreover, when  1 746478 . 0 2  
s  , the higher value of 
y  increases the probability that  *
3
, j s  > *
2
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Figure 11: The simulation results to compare the follower’s profits in the second 
and the third stage 
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Proposition 5: When 
s c
2 2 1      , and  j c i c c c , ,  , the leader will decide to launch a new 
sustainable product (move to the second stage) if 
a.  z y  , or 
b. 0 <  1 3 2  
c   and  
i.  z y   and   i s s j c c c a c a , ,    , or 
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Explaination: Figure 12 shows the conditions that allow the leader to have higher profits 
when launching a new sustainable product. The intuition of Proposition 5a is the same as 
the intuition of Proposition 2. For part b and c of Proposition 5, it is easier for the leader 
to decide to launch a new sustainable product when 
c
2   has a high value. That is from 




, i c i s     on the right hand side are easier to 
satisfied than the conditions on the left hand side. When  y z  , the leader will decide to 
launch a new sustainable product if  1 3 2  
c  , but if  1 3 2  
c  , the leader will decide 
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 is also satisfied. When  z y  , the leader will 
decide to launch a new sustainable product if the difference between the maximum 
willingness to pay and the marginal cost for a sustainable product is high enough (higher 
than the difference between the maximum willingness to pay and the marginal cost for a 
conventional product, or  j c c i s s c a c a , ,    ). Moreover, if  1 3 2  
c   and  z y  , the 






,  . The intuition is 
that when the degree of substitution is high enough ( 1 3 2  
c  ), consumers are easier to 
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Proposition 6: When  3 1    ,  j c i c c c , ,  , and  j s i s c c , ,  , the leader will decide to launch a 
new sustainable product (move to the second stage) if  
a.  z v  , OR 
b. ( z v   or  z v  ) and             
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Explaination: The intuition for Proposition 7a is the same as the intuition in Proposition 
2. The intuition in part b is that the maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable 
product has to be higher than the marginal cost of the sustainable product, such that 
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)  in order 
to make the leader’s profit in the third stage be higher than the leader’s profit in the first 
stage. 
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and  s a . That is the higher value of  s a increases the probability that  *
3
,i s   is greater than 
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The expansion of the model to cover the uncertainty on the maximum willingness 
to pay for a sustainable product is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Simulation for the Egg Industry 
 
There are many studies analyzied about the price premium of a free-range or cage 
free egg. The price premium of a free-range or cage-free egg ranges from 47.72% to 
105.15% as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The price premium of a free-range or cage-free egg and the source of 
information 
Source  Price premium of a free-rang or  
cage-free egg (%) 
Chang, Lusk and Norwood , 2010  57 
Mintel, 2008  60 
Satimanon and Weatherspoon, 2010  47.72 
United Egg Producer, --- (based on the 
USDA weekly retail shell egg) 
105.15 
 
Promar internatioanl (2009) collected the data about the additional cost for a free-rang or 
cage-free egg from several sources. The additional cost for the free-range or cage-free 
egg was range from 20% to 66%. In addition, Summer (2008) presented that the 
difference of production costs between cage production system ($ 0.745 per dozen) and 
non-cage production system ($ 1.05 per dozen) equal to 40.94% . There are no data about 
egg manufacturer’ production costs. Therefore, we assume that all of the costs in the 
manufacture level for the sustainable and the conventional eggs are the same except the 
cost for the raw material, eggs from the farmers. Moreover, we will use $ 0.745 as a cost 
for the conventional egg or assume that the egg price sold by farmers is the same as the 
cost. This is for simplicity and we are not interested in farmers’ margin. 
There are two scenarios for the simulation which are the best case scenario and 
the worst case scenario. The price premium and the additional cost for a free-range or 
cage-free egg in the best case scenario are 105.15% and 20%, respectively. On the other 
hand, the price premium and the additional cost for a free-range or cage-free egg in the 
worst case scenario are 40.72% and 66%. To comply with the variables in the model, we 






,  in the second stage equal to 1/1.66 











, equal to 1.4772 (2.0515) 
for the worst (best) case scenario. Moreover, we assume that  j c i c c c , ,  ,  j s i s c c , ,  , and 
         3 2 2 1
s c  for the simplicity. 
 
Simulation Results 
The simulation results support the leader and the follower to launch a new 
sustainable product, a sustainable egg. That is the leader’s profit when launching the new 
sustainable egg is higher than the profit when producing the conventional egg, and so do 
the follower. This is consistent with case 1 in Figure 2.1. 
The equilibrium profits, prices, and quantities of the worst case and the best case 
have similar trend and sign, except the amount of the equilibrium variables. Figure 15 
shows that when the maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable egg ( s a ) is high or 
the market of the sustainable egg has a big size, the leader and the follower have a high 
profit when launching the sustianable egg. Figure 15 also shows that when the degree of 
substitution between the conventional and the sustainable eggs ( ) closes to 1, the leader 26 
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and the follower have a lower profit when launching the sustainable egg; however, in 
both cases, the worst case and the best case, the leader and the follower still have higher 
profits than the profits when producing the conventional product. This is because if 
consumers perceive that the conventional and the sustainable egg are similar, consumers 





   
 
Figure 15: The relationship between the difference between the profits of 
launching the sustainable egg and producing the conventional egg, 
and the degree of substitution between the sustainable and the conventional eggs 
 
 
Backward induction is used to explain the decision making to move to the next 
stage or the decision making whether the firm should launch the sustainable egg. 
Therefore, we consider the follower’s decision making to launch the sustainable egg first; 
then, the leader will make the decision given the follower’s decision. Figure 16 shows 
that the follower’s profit when launching the sustainable egg is higher than the follower’s 




, j c j s    > 0); therefore, the follower 
decides to launch the sustainable egg. The equilibrium price of the conventional egg in 
the second stage is the lowest price comparing to other prices in the second and the third 












, j s j c p p  ) because consumers are willing 
to pay more for the sustainable egg. The price of the sustainable egg of the follower in the 





, i s j s p p  ) as the explaination in Standard Finding 3. When the degree of 
substitution between two types of eggs is low (Figure 16.1), the price of the sustainable 
egg in the second stage is higher than the prices of the sustainable egg in the third stage 






, j s i s i x p p p   ). The reason is that consumers perceive that two types of eggs are 
different; therefore, the price of the sustainable egg is high and higher than the prices of 
the sustainable egg in the third stage. However, When the degree of substitution between 
two types of eggs is high (Figure 16.2), the price of the sustainable egg in the second 
stage is low and lower than the leader’s price of the sustainable egg in the third stage or 
even lower than the follower’s price of the sustainable egg in the third stage 
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, i x j s i s p p p   ) . This is because consumers do not 
realize the difference between two types of eggs, so the leader’s price of the sustainable 






Figure 16.1:   = 0.3      Figure 16.2:   = 0.7 
 
Figure 16: The relationship between the equilibrium variables in  
the first and the third stage and the maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable egg 
 
 
  Next, the leader makes a decision making to launch the sustainable egg given the 
information that the follower decide to launch the sustainable egg when the leader 
launchs the sustainable eggs. Figure 17 compares the equilibrium variables in the first 
and the third stage. Figure 17 shows that the leader’s profit in the third stage ( *
3
,i s  ) is 
higher than the leader’s profit in the first stage (
1
,i c  ); hence, the leader decides to 
launch the sustainable egg. The equilibrium prices and quantities in the first stage are 








, j c i c q q  ) since we assume the same 
marginal costs for the conventional egg ( j c i c c c , ,  ). The equilibrium price of the 
conventional egg in the first stage ( *
1
,i c p ) is lower than the equilibrium prices in the 
third stage ( *
3
,i s p  and  *
3
, j s p ) because consumers are willing to pay more for the 
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Figure 17: The relationship between the equilibrium variables in 
the first and the third stage and the maximum willingness to pay for the sustainable egg 
 
 
In sum, according to the prices and the costs of the conventional and the 
sustainable egg from the literatue, both the leader and the follower egg manufacture firms 
should launch the sustainable egg to get higher profits. Therefore, we can observe the 
expansion of the sustainable egg market during the past few years. 
 
Conclusion 
  We construct the model for food manufactures’ decision making to launch a new 
sustainable product to the market. The main factors that influence firms to launh the new 
sustainable product are that consumers are willing to pay more for the sustainable 
product, and perceive that the conventional and the sustainable products are different. 
Morover, the firms has more probability to get higher profit when launching the new 
sustainable product if the ratio of the cost over the maximum willingness to pay for the 
conventional product is equal to or greater than the same ratio of the sustainable product. 
  We use the values of costs and prices of the conventional egg and the sustainable 
egg for the simulation part in order to have better understanding about the firms’ decision 
making. According to the figures from the literature, egg manufacturers should launh the 
sustainable egg in order to get higher profits 
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Appendix A: The expansion of the model for the uncertainty in demand side 
 
The author focuses on the expansion of the model for the uncertainty in demand 
side. That is whether consumers would like to pay more for the sustainable product is still 
questionable for food manufactures. This issue is very important for manufactures’ 
decision making to launch a new sustainable product. Many articles about market entry 
concerned about the uncertainty on a demand or a profitability (Maggi, 1996; Hirokawa, 
and Sasaki, 2001; Creane, and Jeitschko, 2010). 
The reasons why the uncertainty in demand side is explicily represented in the 
model are: 1) The author would like to make a model as simple as possible; therefore, the 
uncertainty in supply side is not included in the model, and 2) The firm can control about 
costs, but not consumer’s demand. The uncertainty is added only in the second stage 
because of three reasons. First, the first stage is a current situation. Firms know the 
exising demand; hence, there is no uncertainty. Second, there is an uncertainty in the 
second stage. It has never had the new product in the target market before the second 
stage, so a firm can not expect about the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for the 
new product. Third, since the new sustainable product was launched already in the 
second stage, the firms know the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for the new 
product already. Therefore, there is no uncertainty in the third stage. 
Many authors applied the real option method to consider uncertainty of launching 
a new product or investing in reserch and development a new product (Han, Smit, and 
Ankum, 1993; Grenadier, 2000; Botteron, Chesney, and Gibson-Asner, 2003; Russo, 
Cardillo, and Perito, 2003; Schwartz, 2004; Kijima, and Shibata, 2005). However, the 
real option is not suitable to our model since the real option is usually set up to deal with 
a pattern of continuous time and infinite period; while, the model in this paper is a three-
stage discrete time game. 
The idea of the binary distribution of maximum willingness to pay of a 
sustainable product ( s a ) is adapted from the demand function in Creane, and Jeitschko 
(2010). That is  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( Q P Q P Q P        where   is the consumers’ perception of 
the fraction of high quality products, and  ) (Q P  ( ) (Q P ) is an inverse demand of products 
of known high (low) quality. An inverse demand function of sustainable product in the 
second stage is    j c
s
i s c s i s q q a a p , 2 , , ) 1 (          where   represents the leader firm’s 
expectation that consumers would like to pay more for a new sustainable product, and   
has a value between zero and one. According to the inverse demand function defined 


























Figure 18: The relationship between the expected maximum willingness to pay  
for a sustainable product and the probability that the leader expect that consumers are 
willing to pay more for the sustainable product ( ) 
 
The resutlts when the uncertainty is added into the model is shown as follows: 
 
Standard Finding 4: When an intercept of an inverse demand function are the same for a 
conventional product and a sustainable product ( c s a a  ), results of a case with risk and 
without risk are the same (  is disappear). This is because a risk in the model represents 
via a maximum willingness to pay for a sustainable product. When amounts of maximum 
willingness to pay for a sustainable product and a conventional product are the same, the 
uncertainty represented by   is disappeared. 
Explaination: This assumption represents the worst case scenario that is the leader firm 
expects to get zero premiums from the new product. Therefore, there is no uncertainty 
defined in the model since the firm assumes the lowest maximum willingnes to pay for 
the sustainable product already. 
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Explaination: From Proposition 7, the leader will get a higher profit when launching a 
new sustainable product if the probability to get the premium from consumers is high 




c , 0 ), or if the marginal cost of the conventional product over the 
maximum willingness to pay for the conventional product is high enough 
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1
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   
). Intuitively, Propsition 7  presents that 
the leader will decide to launch a new sustainable product when the probability to get the 
price premium for a new sustainable product is high enough, or the marginal cost of a 
conventional product (the maximum willingness to pay for a conventioanl product) is 
high (low) enough. 
The intuition of Propsition 8, 9, and 10 are similar to the intuition of Proposition 
7. That is the first condition of all propositions present that the leader has a higher profit 
than the follower when the probability to get the premium from consumers ( ) is high 
enough; and the second conditions of the propositions implies that the leader has a higher 
profit than the follower when the marginal cost of the conventional product over the 
maximum willingness to pay for the conventional product is high enough 35 
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Appendix B: The calculation for the profits in each stage 
 
The First Stage: 
In this stage, both firms produce conventional product and choose a price as a 
strategy simultaneously. Firm i and firm  j ’s inverse demand functions are: 
j c i c c i c q q a p , 1 , ,     , and            (1) 
i c j c c j c q q a p , 1 , ,     .            (2) 












i c j c c
i c
p p a












j c i c c
j c
p p a







, , 1 1
i c i c














 , where  i c c ,  and  j c c ,  are marginal costs to 
produce a conventional product of firm i and firm  j , respectively. Then, we solve a 
problem by finding the first order condition (FOC) to get the reaction functions. 
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.      (9) 
Similarly, 
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) 1 ( , , 1 1 j c i c c c p a  
.      (10)   
(9) and (10) represents reaction functions of firm i and firm  j . From (9) and (10) we get 
the optimal prices in stage 1 ( *
1
,i c p , and  *
1
, j c p ) as follows:  *
1
,i c p  = 
   
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, and  *
1
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.    
Plug the equilibrium prices into the demand functions, then we get the equilibrium 
quantities in the first stage ( *
1
,i c q , and  *
1
, j c q ) as follows: 
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1
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Then, firm i and firm  j  ’s profits in the first stage ( *
1
i  , and  *
1
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. 
 
The Second Stage:  
  The leader firm which is assumed to be firm i launches a new sustainable product 
into the market, while the follower (firm j ) still supplies a conventional product. Both 
firms choose price as the strategy simultaneously. An inverse demand function of firm i 
who produces sustainable product is, 
j c
s
i s s i s q q a p , 2 , ,     ,               (3) 
and an inverse demand function of firm  j  who produces conventional product is, 
i s
c
j c c j c q q a p , 2 , ,     ,              (4) 
where 
c s
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     . Firm i ’s first 
order condition is as follows: 
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.         
Similarly,  j c p ,  =   
2




c p c a a     
.  Next, from the reaction functions of firm i  
and  j , we can get the equilibrium prices in the second stage ( *
2
,i s p , and  *
2
, j c p ), which 
are:  *
2
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. Then, the equilibrium quantities in the second stage 
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,i s q  and  *
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, j c q ) are:  *
2
,i s q  = 
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. Also when we plug all 
equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities into profit functions, we get profits at 
equilibrium of both firms ( *
2
i  , and  *
2
j  ):  *
2
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. 
 
The Third Stage:  
In this stage, the follower firm (firm  j ) also supplies a new sustainable product. 
Both firms still choose prices as a choice variable. However, it is a sequential game in 
this stage. That is the leader will choose its own price first and then the follower decides 
to choose the price later. That is, the leader will put the reaction function of firm  j  into 
its own objective function in order to protect the new market. An inverse demand 
function of firm iwho is the leader is, 
j s i s s i s q q a p , 3 , ,     ,               (5) 
and an inverse demand function of firm  j  who follows to produce sustainable product is,  
i s j s s j s q q a p , 3 , ,     .              (6) 
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. Then, we find firm j ’s reaction function in order to put it into 
firm i ’s objective function in the next step (backward induction). Firm  j ’s profit 




, , 3 3








    
j s i s s
j s j s j j s j s j s j
p p a
c p I q c p . Firm  j ’s 
first order condition is as follows: 





            = 0, 
2
3
, , 3 3 , ,
1




     j s i s s j s j s p p a p c
  = 0, 
 
2
) 1 ( , , 3 3 j s i s s c p a     
      =  j s p , .     (11) 







, , 3 3








   
i s j s s
i s i s i s i s i s i
p p a
c p q c p . Then, we substitute reaction 


























j s i s s
s
















. From the first order 
condition, the equilibrium price of firm i in the third stage is  *
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,i s p  = 
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. Substitute  *
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,i s p  into the reation function of firm 
j ; then, we get  the equilibrium price of firm  j  in the third stage as:  *
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. Finally, the equilibrium profits in 
the third stage ( *
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,i s  , and  *
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, j s  ) are: 
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Appendix C: The Proof for standard findings and propositions 
 
The proof for Standard Finding 1 
The difference of profits in the first stage between two firms ( *
1
,i c   -  *
1
, j c  ) is 
4
) )( 2 (
2
1




j c i c j c i c c c c c c a
. The denominatior is a negative value since 0 < 1  < 1 and the 
first term of the nominator is a positive value since  i c c c a ,   and  j c c c a ,  . If  i c c ,  is 
greater than  j c c , ,  *
1
,i c   -  *
1
, j c   will be less than 0. This means that a firm that has a 
higher cost also has a lower profit. Moreover,  1   has no effect on a sign of  *
1
,i c   - 
*
1
, j c  , but the amount of a difference in profits.  
 
The proof for Standard Finding 2 
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. 
The first term is a positive value while the second term is a negative value since 
1 0 2  




, j c i s     will be greater than zero when the absolute 
value of the first term is greater than the absolute value of the seceond term; that is when 
the conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied. 
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The proof for Proposition 4 
*
3
, j s   -  *
2













































) 2 ( 16
) 2 (









. The first term is a negative 
value since  1 0 2  
c  . The second term will be a negative value if 































s s y y

 
. The conditions to 































s s y y

 
 are shown in 










, i c i s     =       
















c c z a y c
 
 
         



















i s z a y c
 
   
. The first term, 
     
















c c z a y c
 
 
 , is a negative value since  1 0 2  
c  . The second term, 
         



















i s z a y c
 
   
, is also a positive value since  1 0 2  
c  . 
The second term is greater than the first term, or the leader firm will get a higher profit 
when launch a new sustainable product if the conditions in Proposition 5 are satisfied. 
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negative when the conditions in Proposition 6 are satisfied. 
 
The proof for Standard Finding 4 
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conditons in Proposition 7 are satisfied. 
 
The proof for Proposition 8 
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The proof for Proposition 9 
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The proof for Proposition 10 
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